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ABSTRACT 
 
 Protecting data from malicious computer users continues to grow in importance.  
Whether preventing unauthorized access to personal photographs, ensuring compliance 
with federal regulations, or ensuring the integrity of corporate secrets, all applications 
require increased security to protect data from talented intruders.  Specifically, as more 
and more files are preserved on disk the requirement to provide secure storage has 
increased in importance.  This paper presents a survey of techniques for securely storing 
data, including theoretical approaches, prototype systems, and existing systems currently 
available.  Due to the wide variety of potential solutions available and the variety of 
techniques to arrive at a particular solution, it is important to review the entire field prior 
to selecting an implementation that satisfies particular requirements.  This paper provides 
an overview of the prominent characteristics of several systems to provide a foundation 
for making an informed decision.  Initially, the paper establishes a set of criteria for 
evaluating a storage solution based on confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
performance.  Then, using these criteria, the paper explains the relevant characteristics of 
select storage systems and provides a comparison of the major differences.  
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
  
 With the proliferation of stored data in all environments, organizations face an 
increasing requirement to both temporarily and permanently retain information.  The 
storage medium for housing this information becomes a prime target for attack by a 
malicious intruder.  If an outsider can successfully penetrate the data storage, the intruder 
can potentially gain information that violates privacy, that discloses valuable secrets, or 
that prevents the access of legitimate users; the deleterious effects of such an attack are 
truly unquantifiable.  If the organization takes no storage security measures, the data store 
becomes a lucrative single point of attack for an intruder.  The avoidance of this 
obviously unfavorable condition has generated a detailed field of computer research.  
Universities have actively pursued options for securing stored information, and have 
consequently developed many potential schemes for ensuring information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability without substantially degrading performance.  See Figure 1 for 
a relational diagram of ongoing research. 
 A major problem associated with storing large amounts of data is how to properly 
weigh the costs and benefits associated with security measures.  The most secure systems 
are so because of the increased measures to protect the data, but each additional measure 
comes with a cost in terms of both convenience and processing time.  In order to 
effectively select the best security scheme, users must have an understanding of the 
primary security features available in the storage security community and then be able to 
quantifiably compare the systems.  Developing an understanding of these aspects will 
help to motivate the direction for future research and assist the selection of the 
appropriate storage solution for a set of specific requirements. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
standardized set of criteria to evaluate secure storage systems.  Section 3 provides a 
survey of eight storage systems.  Section 4 provides a classification and comparison of 
the surveyed systems, and Section 5 concludes. 
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Figure 1  Relational diagram of current research 
 
 
2. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
 
 This section establishes a common set of criteria for evaluating a storage security 
system.  There are many different ways to approach storage systems but for the purposes 
of establishing a common reference, confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
performance have been selected.   While this paper does not approach any criteria in 
exhaustive detail, it is necessary to describe the evaluation criteria prior to assessing the 
individual systems.  Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are commonly referred to 
in the computer security arena, and performance was added to ensure systems achieve an 
appropriate balance between security and processing ability.  Prior to discussing each 
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aspect in more detail, it is important to understand that none of these attributes is 
mutually exclusive, and, in fact, to have a secure system all attributes must be satisfied. 
 
2.1 Confidentiality 
 From a security perspective, ensuring confidentiality implies that no one has 
access to data unless specifically authorized.   Different systems control this authorization 
process in various ways.  The first step in authorizing access to information is to properly 
identify users via authentication.  The storage system must define the means for a user to 
be properly identified prior to gaining access, and then having appropriately identified a 
user, the system must allow access to only specified data associated with that user.  
Proper authorization to access the storage system does not imply access to the entire 
system, in fact, the contrasting principle of least privilege is generally applied.  Data 
owners must, however, have a method for allowing others to access information when 
appropriate via a delegation of authorization scheme. 
 In addition to managing authorization to data, confidentiality also implies that the 
system must encrypt data to prevent information attacks.  Therefore, the system must 
require either users or servers to apply cryptographic keys.  The differing design 
decisions between user managed and sever managed keys have had significant impact on 
the overall storage technique.  In order to share information, multiple users must have 
access to the appropriate keys – whether a centralized group server hands out keys or 
individual file owners provide the keys to additional users, the effects on performance 
and user convenience must be analyzed.  The discussion of key management in this paper 
is not intended to detail cryptography, but an understanding of how keys are distributed 
and applied is essential to understanding the larger system.  Since the cryptographic 
operations are often the most computationally expensive aspect of accessing securely 
stored data, understanding how a particular system manages keys is appropriate. 
 An additional critical discussion concerning key management involves how keys 
are revoked.  Once an owner or administrator determines to revoke a particular user’s 
access to data, the keys that the user had must no longer allow access to the system, or if 
they do they must not allow access to future versions of the files.  The cost associated 
with revoking a user manifests itself in the re-encryption effort required to secure 
confidentiality.  It is not possible to physically revoke a user’s keys to prevent that user’s 
ability to perform operations since copies could have been produced, so the system must 
render all keys of a revoked user obsolete and re-encrypt all of the data with a new key.  
A resulting argument then turns, once again, to a tradeoff between security and 
performance.  There are two primary methods for securing the data after key revocation: 
lazy or aggressive revocation.  When using lazy revocation the system does not re-
encrypt the data that the revoked user previously had authorization to access until the 
next valid user attempts to access the file.  This essentially defrays the cost over time, but 
it leaves data vulnerable to the revoked user for an unspecified period of time.  By 
contrast, aggressive revocation immediately re-encrypts all files that the revoked user 
could potentially access.  Once re-encrypted, new keys must be distributed to all 
personnel who are affected by the changed encryption (adding additional weight to the 
key distribution scheme); clearly this option requires time.  Lazy re-encryption sacrifices 
a measure of security to save time while aggressive revocation sacrifices time to improve 
security. 
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2.2 Integrity 
 Integrity is a broadly based topic that includes maintaining data consistency in the 
face of both accidental and malicious attacks on data.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
scope of the integrity analysis is limited to the methods used to prevent malicious 
alteration or destruction of information.  The resulting expectation is that when a user 
accesses stored information, no data has been subjected to unauthorized modification.  
Many systems enforce integrity by ensuring that data comes from the expected source.  
For stored data, the discussion of integrity implies that files have not been changed on the 
disk. 
 Integrity enforcement procedures fall into two categories: data modification 
prevention and data modification detection.  Similar to confidentiality, modification 
prevention requires users to receive authorization prior to changing files and requires that 
files are only changed in an approved manner.  Integrity varies from confidentiality in 
that confidentiality is only worried about whether or not data has been compromised, 
whereas integrity includes ensuring the correctness of the data.  Detection schemes 
generally assume that attacks are inevitable and that there must be suitable ways to assess 
any damage done, recover from the damage, and apply lessons learned to future 
prevention mechanisms. 
 
2.3 Availability 
 The paper considers availability in terms of time, space, and representation.  
Information needs to be available to an authorized user within an acceptable time period, 
without monopolizing the available storage space, and in an understandable 
representation.  A system can not allow an adversary to prevent authorized access to 
information via a denial of service attack. 
 It is important to note that the goals of availability conflict to a degree with those 
of confidentiality; the two must be considered within the security domain. 
 
2.4 Performance 
 The level of security and the system performance often conflict.  In order to 
provide the requisite layers of security to avoid harmful attacks, the system performance 
suffers.  The two goals of an efficient system and a secure environment intrinsically 
conflict.  Each additional security measure requires computationally expensive 
processing that detracts from the system’s ability to perform other operations; all security 
measures are overhead for the system.  Each of the evaluated storage techniques attempts 
to minimize the performance cost associated with the particular measures of the system. 
 The most dominant performance cost is associated with encryption due to its 
computationally expensive nature.  The two fundamentally different approaches to 
storage security, encrypt-on-wire and encrypt-on-disk, place the burden of encryption on 
different aspects of the system.  Riedel et al [25] provide a detailed explanation of the 
tradeoffs between the two.  
 
3. SURVEY 
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 The following survey briefly describes several storage security approaches using 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and performance as a framework.  Sections 3.1-3.3 
refer to encrypt on wire systems and Sections 3.4-3.8 refer to encrypt on disk systems. 
 
3.1 NASD – Network Attached Secure Disks.   
In traditional distributed file systems, a client wanting to access data must make a 
request to the file server.  The server then must verify the client’s authorization and 
distribute the file if the appropriate criteria are met.  Since the server must interact with 
every file access request for every client, the server can quickly become a bottleneck.  
NASD’s primary goal is to relieve the server bottleneck by interacting with a user one 
time providing a “capability key.”  With the capability key the user can access the 
appropriate disk(s) directly without any further server interaction.  The disks themselves 
must be “intelligent” such that they possess enough internal ability to process the 
capability key and handle file access requests directly [10,11]. 
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Figure 2 NASD 
 
Confidentiality.  There are two servers in the NASD design, one to provide authentication 
and then the actual file server.   NASD does not specify the authentication scheme and 
recommends using any existing method similar to Kerberos.  Upon receipt of 
authentication, a user sends a request to the file server.  The server verifies the 
authenticity of the request and then provides the user with a capability key that 
corresponds to the user’s rights for file access.  After obtaining the capability key, a user 
can communicate directly with the data disk for all future access requests during a given 
session. 
The capability object is the critical aspect pertaining to both the confidentiality 
and integrity of the system.  A file manager agreeing to a client's access request privately 
sends a capability token and a capability key to the client; together these form a 
capability object.  The token contains the access rights being granted for the request and 
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the key is a message authentication code (MAC) consisting of the capabilities and a 
secret key shared between the file server and the actual disk drive.  Clients can then make 
a direct request to a NASD drive by providing the capability object.  The drive then uses 
the secret key that it shares with the file server to interpret the capability token to verify 
the user’s access rights and service the request.  Since the MAC can only be interpreted 
using the drive/server shared secret key, any modifications to the arguments or false 
arguments will result in a denied request. 
  
Integrity.  The novel concept associated with NASD is placing part of the data integrity 
requirement on the disks themselves.  The “intelligent” disks interpret the capabilities 
objects, encrypt data, and transmit results to clients.  To ensure integrity on the client end, 
the disk uses the same hash MAC combination that allowed it to authorize a client access 
to encrypt and send the data to the client.  The client can then verify the integrity of the 
transmission during the decryption process. 
 
Availability.  The fact that NASD allows direct access to the disk promotes scalability; 
the system throughput scales linearly with the number of clients and disks.  However, 
since the file server must be trusted to initially provide capability keys, the server 
presents a single point of attack.  If the server becomes compromised there is no way to 
prevent a denial of service attack. 
 
Performance.  A motivating factor for using NASD is the ability to scale bandwidth 
linearly with the number of disks in the system, however, these benefits are partially 
offset by the cost of cryptography.  A large performance problem associated with NASD 
is the dual cost of cryptographic operations incurred due to the encrypt-on-wire scheme.  
Every data transmission must be encrypted prior to being sent and then decrypted at its 
destination from disk to client or from client to disk.  In an attempt to reduce the 
performance penalty, NASD uses a “hash and MAC” cryptographic approach instead of a 
standard MAC.  In a traditional MAC algorithm, a client’s secret key is used throughout 
the computation.  In contrast, hash and MAC uses the raw data from the file to pre-
compute a series of message digests that are generic for the given file.  Hash and MAC 
then applies a client’s secret key to the message digests only as a client requests a file.  
The result is that the secret key is only required for a small subset of the overall 
computation, thus significantly decreasing latency associated with on-the-fly 
cryptography.  Experiments demonstrated that the latency for using cryptographic 
operations was bounded by a 20% increase in the time to service a request when 
compared to a request with no cryptography [10]. 
 
3.2 PASIS – Survivable Storage 
PASIS is a survivable storage system designed to address problems associated 
with compromised servers; the system assumes that compromised servers will exist and 
therefore addresses how to protect data in such an environment.  PASIS employs a 
threshold scheme to distribute trust among storage nodes to prevent data security 
breaches even when faced with a compromised server.  The threshold scheme encodes, 
replicates, and divides information such that the pieces of data are stored in different 
locations.  In order to make the data disbursement transparent to users, PASIS requires a 
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client side “agent” to interpret user-level commands and the associated responses from 
the various PASIS servers connected to the storage nodes [8,33]. 
 
Confidentiality.  PASIS strives to prevent data compromise by storing elements of a file 
in different locations so that a single compromised server cannot disclose any relevant 
information.  Instead of cryptography to ensure confidentiality, PASIS uses a ramp p-m-n 
threshold scheme that divides data into n shares such that any m of the shares can 
reconstruct the original data, but fewer than p shares reveals no information about the 
original.  (Cryptography and a threshold scheme can be combined to increase the level of 
protection, however, any cryptography would have to be layered on top of PASIS).  As 
long as less than p shares are ever visible to an intruder no information will be 
compromised. 
 
Integrity.  PASIS helps provide data integrity by not relying on any specific set of PASIS 
servers to provide the required m shares of the data.  Since having any set of m shares 
allows the client agent to reconstruct the original data, those m shares can come from any 
of the various servers in the network.  In order to prevent data integrity an intruder must 
compromise the m servers servicing the request and alter the data.  If the client agent does 
not receive the requisite m shares or is unable to recreate the original file due to malicious 
intervention, the request is rebroadcast.   
 
Availability.  Similar to the argument made for the PASIS integrity enhancements, the 
system’s requirement for only m shares to retrieve data increases data availability in the 
face of failed servers.  The number of servers required in the “surviving” subset of 
servers has an upper bound of m, such that (n-m) servers can be compromised or 
unavailable and the system will still successfully service the request.  Similarly, with a 
write operation the system administrator can determine the number of shares required to 
accept the write.  At least m shares must be successfully written, but any number between 
n and m will provide the correct data.  Clearly, the more successfully written shares will 
provide for greater availability on subsequent file access requests. 
Even though PASIS provides for increased data availability for single users, it 
does not directly address concurrent access or concurrent modifications to files.  This 
implies that some additional mechanism must be layered on top of PASIS to guarantee 
atomicity, which in turn implies potential message passing overhead or latency when 
multiple users access the same file simultaneously. 
 
Performance.  In relative comparison to a traditional distributed file system, PASIS is 
hindered by an increased number of message passes to receive the same information.  A 
traditional system sends a request to a single server, whereas PASIS must broadcast 
requests to at least m servers and then combine the resultant messages on the client 
machine.  It is difficult to quantify the overhead associated with PASIS because there are 
great performance trade-offs associated with selecting different values for n-m-p.  The 
values, however, can be customized for a particular file.  For example, increasing the 
value of n increases the likelihood that m shares will be available, but it also means that 
more shares of the file are stored, thus increasing the potential for theft.  The benefit of 
this flexibility allows users to select appropriate values for each file they store in the 
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system.  During their research, the PASIS designers discovered a significant performance 
cost for accessing small files, but a negligible penalty for large files [33].   
 
3.3 S4 – Self Securing Storage 
S4 is a self-securing storage medium that introduces a new aspect to storage 
security: the disks do not trust even the host machine operating system.  S4 treats all 
requests as suspect.  The driving security motivation for the system has been to negate the 
effects of a clever intruder who is able to successfully penetrate the operating system and 
disguise any adversarial efforts.  The disks themselves in S4 require a small set of 
fundamental operations for managing a file system and therefore have an embedded 
instruction set for internally versioning and auditing all data and metadata.  S4 uses a 
daemon on the client machine to service file access requests as remote procedure calls 
and then translate them into S4-specific requests to make the system transparent to users.  
[26, 13, 28, 27].   
 
Confidentiality.  S4 does not provide any method for authentication, but rather assumes 
that the self-securing disks will be used in conjunction with a file server that uses one of 
many standard authentication protocols.  All access requests properly sent to S4 will be 
serviced without any additional verification. 
 
Integrity.  The focus of the system then is not designed for confidentiality, but rather for 
ensuring data integrity.  An underlying theme for the design of S4 is that confidentiality 
will eventually become breached in any system.  Analyzing the history of breached 
systems and studying the success of intruders, the researchers at Carnegie Mellon 
University assumed compromised servers as an unfortunate reality.  They made the 
primary focus for their storage research preventing an intruder from damaging the stored 
data and capturing the intruder’s actions through detection and diagnosis. 
 S4 uses a comprehensive versioning protocol that creates a new version of file 
metadata for every file access.  S4 establishes a detection window during which all data 
and metadata are comprehensively versioned.  In addition to versioning obvious write 
activity that changes the data itself, each file access also results in an update to the file’s 
log so that any improper access can later be questioned.  The period of the detection 
window is largely defined by the amount of space available for keeping the overhead of 
multiple versions and has proven to be approximately two weeks in research [26].  
Considerable research has resulted in a combination of a journal-based structure and 
multi-version B-trees to efficiently keep all of the requisite information in a space 
efficient manner. 
If at any time during the detection window an intrusion occurs, the system can 
guarantee the integrity of all data up to the point of the intrusion.  Additionally, after 
verifying the access logs for individual files, files can be safely recovered if no anomalies 
exist.  Files that have questionable accesses in the post-intrusion period may result in lost 
data, but the user can still be guaranteed not to receive the tainted file.  This is a critical 
aspect of S4, other systems may allow a user to unknowingly access a file modified 
during an intrusion, but S4 will prevent such an integrity violation.  The system 
administrator establishes the detection window, and once set, no user can prevent any 
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access to data from being versioned.  This precludes an intruder from altering a file in an 
undetectable fashion.   
 
Availability.  Through comprehensive versioning, self-securing storage inherently 
ensures data is available to users.  Immediately after the system administrator detects an 
intrusion, all of the files can be reliably restored to the last access prior to the intrusion.  
Legitimate changes made after the intrusion but prior to its detection may result in lost 
data, but the lost data can be minimized.  S4 includes an inherent intrusion detection 
scheme that can analyze the access history of files that the system administrator deems 
appropriate.  If, for instance, an intruder attempts to change the contents of a password 
file which the administrator is “watching,” the intrusion can be detected immediately.  By 
minimizing the deleterious effects of an intrusion, the system naturally increases data 
availability. 
 
Performance.  Considering the costs of maintaining versions for every file access, the 
designers searched for both space and time efficient means for achieving comprehensive 
versioning.  They use journal-based metadata and multi-version binary trees to meet their 
objectives.  The system has proven to operate at a comparable speed with traditional NFS 
for current-file lookup.  For back-in-time access, the lookup time is dependent on the 
number of versions which must be traversed.  However, this can be bounded by a system 
administrator’s determination to checkpoint the file system. 
   
3.4 CFS Cryptographic File System 
CFS is archaic, but it is relevant to discuss CFS because it formed a theoretical 
stepping stone for other researchers to establish system design goals.  A primary 
motivation for CFS was to eliminate the requirement for user or system-level 
cryptography and instead place the requirement in the file system.  Manual or application 
based cryptographic operations were either error-prone or incompatible with one another.  
System level solutions lacked portability caused by embedded encryption techniques, 
they lacked compatibility due to specialized server authentication software, or they left 
potential security holes where data was temporarily stored as clear text.  CFS proposed 
pushing all file encryption into the client file system.  It used a /crypto mount point in 
Unix to mask CFS specific operations allowing the file system to treat encrypted files like 
any others.  The system was designed for a local, not distributed, use, therefore an 
individual user must physically “hand-out” the cryptographic keys for each file [3]. 
 
Confidentiality.  The only method for controlling authorization is the file owner’s 
selectivity with passing requisite keys out to other users.  It is the user’s responsibility to 
ensure that the keys are distributed in a secure manner to only the correct and intended 
personnel.  The method, while not scalable, does not rely on a trusted server.  The owner 
of a file encrypts it with a symmetric key prior to writing it to the file system.  Neither the 
file system, nor any users, ever has access to the clear text data.  There are no special 
provisions for ensuring that the data is encrypted on the wire, but one can operate under 
the assumption that if the file leaves the client machine in encrypted form, is never 
modified by the server or the file system, and then is transmitted to another authorized 
client with the proper key that the information has always been secure. 
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CFS mounts a virtual file system (/crypt) to a standard Unix files system, and then 
directs all system calls related to encrypted files through the mount point.  Users create 
directories under the /crypt mount point with an associated key which will then be used to 
encrypt all data stored within the directory.   
 
Integrity.  CFS converts standard NFS system calls into CFS specific calls using a 
daemon on the client machine.  The daemon then issues RPCs to the file server after the 
client establishes a proper connection with the server.  Any attempt to send a RPC 
directly to the file server, thus bypassing the CFS daemon, will be denied because of a 
requirement for all RPCs from a client to have been generated from a privileged port.  
This helps to prevent any malicious user from having access to modify files, but there is 
no direct mechanism to provide additional integrity protection.  CFS relies on the 
assumption that the file server never has access to unencrypted data to ensure data 
integrity.   
 
Availability.  While all files remain encrypted on the file server, there is no mechanism to 
prevent an adversary from denying a legitimate user from accessing files if the server is 
compromised.  The system does, however, use the underlying file system’s sharing 
semantics to allow concurrent access to multiple users.  Once keys are properly 
distributed, CFS provides comparable standard use availability to Unix. 
 
Performance.  CFS runs at user level and interfaces with the underlying file system via 
remote procedure calls.  This implies that there is potential for significant context switch 
overhead in addition to the added cost of DES cryptographic operations.  CFS proved to 
be up to 4 times slower than standard NFS for reading and writing large files, twice as 
slow for creating small files, and 30% slower for a mix of “standard” operations. 
 
3.5  SFS-RO – Secure File System – Read Only 
SFS-RO relies on self-certifying path names to provide high availability to read-only data 
in a distributed environment.  SFS-RO uses some of the concepts from its SFS 
predecessor, but strives for better performance by providing read-only data that does not 
require any server-based cryptographic operations.  The concept is to still ensure data 
integrity while producing multiple copies of read-only material; traditionally such 
copying resulted in a degradation of security [7, 17]. 
  
Confidentiality.  SFS-RO relies on a mutual authentication protocol between the users 
and the server, performed via self-certifying pathnames that have the public key for a file 
embedded in them.  The creator of the file has the ability to assign the key, therefore 
offering a wide range of cryptographic options. 
To properly encrypt files, an administrator bundles the contents of the file system 
into a database that is signed with a digital signature containing the private portion of an 
asymmetric key.  Once signed, the database can be replicated and distributed to many 
untrusted machines without the threat of compromise.  In order to access the files, a user 
must provide the location of the storage server (either a DNS hostname or IP address) and 
a HostID.  The HostID is a cryptographic hash of the server location and the public 
portion of the asymmetric key with which the file creator encrypted the database.  The 
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database creator must provide the public key to all potential users separate from the SFS-
RO system.   
Once granted permission to the files via the mutual authentication, the users can 
then access files by providing the appropriate handle, comprised of a cryptographic hash 
of the file’s blocks.  Groups of handles are recursively hashed and stored in hash trees 
such that the handle to the root inode provides the ability to verify the content of 
individual file blocks, reducing the number of handles required throughout the system.  
Knowing the handle of the root inode provides a client with the ability to verify the 
contents of a given file by recursively checking the hashes.   
 
Integrity.  SFS-RO relies on three critical elements:  the SFS database generator, the SFS 
read-only server daemon, and the client.  Traditional directories are converted to a 
database and digitally signed in a secure client environment.  This database is then 
distributed to any number of servers that all run the SFS-RO server daemon.  The server 
daemon simply receives requests from clients to look up and return data.  The SFS client 
runs on a client machine and is a conduit between a standard file system protocol (like 
NFS) and the server.  Upon receipt of a file transmission, it converts the SFS-RO 
database “chunks” into traditional inodes and blocks that a typical file system would 
expect to see.  Additionally the client must posses a private key to verify the digital 
signature on data passed from the server since SFS-RO does not trust the server.  This 
verification process ensures data integrity. 
SFS-RO also uses a timestamp protocol to help detect integrity violations.  When 
a user creates a database, the time is recorded.  Additionally, the creator must establish a 
no-later-than time to resign the database so that the time has an upper and lower bound.  
Users of the files maintain a record of the current timestamp which they compare against 
all data that they receive to prevent a rollback attack. 
 
Availability.  One of the primary goals of SFS-RO is to extend access to read only data in 
a global environment.  To accomplish this, a file system creator can copy the securely 
generated database onto any server that is running the SFS daemon.  The result is a 
system that scales to the number of servers multiplied by the number of connections per 
server.  Since the system is designed for multiple copies of read-only material to be 
distributed amongst multiple machines, it is logical to deduce that destruction of one 
server will not affect the availability of the file. 
 
Performance.  All cryptographic operations are performed on client machines; the creator 
establishes the database in a secure non-networked environment and users receive 
encrypted data which they must decrypt on their client machines.  The cryptographic 
operations proved to be the most costly aspect in comparison to traditional NFS.  For 
small files, SFS-RO was twice as slow as NFS with the primary additional cost due to 
timestamp verification (to ensure integrity).  SFS-RO incurs additional latency when 
compared to NFS because NFS is run in the kernel while SFS-RO must rely on system 
calls.  In larger files where the proportion of system calls to data passed is smaller, the 
slow down was approximately 30% which, while much improved over small files, is still 
a considerable performance penalty.  SFS-RO began to perform favorably with very large 
files (40MB), proving 4% faster than NFS.   
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3.6 SNAD – Secure Network Attached Disks  
Secure Network Attached Disks are designed to prevent any unauthorized 
personnel from accessing stored files by encrypting all data, and only allowing 
decryption on a client machine.  This eliminates the potential threat posed by 
compromising the system administrator’s access rights or that posed by physically 
capturing a disk.  The individual drives lack sufficient information to decrypt any data 
themselves, and rely instead on a key management scheme that provides an authorized 
user with sufficient keys to decrypt files on the remote client machine. [5, 20, 21, 24] 
Confidentiality.  The critical functionality behind SNAD lies in the lockbox mechanism 
for storing keys.  Each file consists of variably sized secure data objects which are all 
individually encrypted with a symmetric object key.  Within the file’s metadata is a 
pointer to a key object for that file which, itself, can be considered a file.  Within the key 
object’s metadata there are fields for a unique key file ID, the user ID for the creator of 
the file, and a digital signature from the last user to modify the file.  The digital signature 
of the last modifier of the file is provided to assure all other users that the key object itself 
has not been modified (any authorized user can verify that the key object signature 
matches with someone authorized to write to the file).  The key object file itself consists 
of tuples that coincide with legitimate users for the original file.  Each tuple contains a 
user ID field, the object symmetric key to access the secure data objects, and a listing of 
whether or not the user has permission to write to the key object (coinciding with 
permission to write to the original file).  The object key is itself encrypted with the public 
portion of a user’s asymmetric key so that the only way to decrypt the object key is with 
the user’s private key on the user’s client machine.  This prevents any intruder from ever 
being able to access the symmetric key that actually encrypted the stored data. 
 In addition to the key objects, SNAD manages authorized users by maintaining a 
certificate object with tuples containing valid user IDs, the user’s public key, a hashed 
message authentication code key to provide and verify user digital signatures, and a 
timestamp the system updates whenever the user performs a write operation to prevent 
replay attacks. 
 
Integrity.  To provide integrity enhancement, SNAD stores a non-linear checksum of the 
original data along with the encrypted data so that a user can verify that the file has not 
been maliciously changed during storage.  The checksum is updated whenever an 
authorized user makes a modification to the file.  Users can also verify the integrity of 
writes by analyzing the file’s key object file metadata and checking the digital signature 
provided. 
 
Availability.  Since the lock-box of keys is a critical aspect of SNAD, it must be available 
for users to access files.  Unfortunately, the lockbox is stored on a single trusted server 
which presents a single point of attack for an adversary.  If the lockbox server is 
compromised, there is no way to prevent a denial of service attack.  Additionally, the 
system does not have a specified key revocation policy and leaves the decision and 
implementation of active or lazy revocation to the file owner. 
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Performance.  The computationally expensive encryption and decryption tasks are 
performed on the client machines and avoid any potential bottleneck at the server.  The 
decryption process, however, can still be very slow even when performed on the 
relatively faster client machines.  To offer a user options, the designers of SNAD have 
implemented three separate schemes for providing digital signatures that trade security 
for performance.  A file’s creator can determine the granularity with which to verify the 
digital signature, the finer the granularity the more security provided and vice versa.  The 
developers have proven through empirical studies that the digital signature process is by 
far the most costly with SNAD [5].  The most secure method where digital signatures are 
provided with each block write and verified with each block read is not suitable for 
standard use.  Only the least secure of the three options (verifying the digital signature 
based on a hashed MAC instead of a public key) proved to be comparable to a system 
without security [21]. 
 
3.7 PLUTUS   
PLUTUS is another lockbox scheme that operates similarly to SNAD, but the 
primary goal of PLUTUS is to provide highly scalable key management while providing 
file owners with direct control over authorizing access to their files.  All data is encrypted 
on the disk with the cryptographic and key management operations performed by the 
clients to alleviate server cryptographic overhead.   Users can customize security policies 
and authentication mechanisms for their own files using the client-based key distribution 
scheme.  This places the responsibility for key management on the user, forcing the file 
owner to ensure proper secure distribution of keys to those they wish to authorize access.  
A prospective user must contact the owner in order to get the appropriate key.  Riedel et 
al [25] argue that this task can be performed with an acceptable cost to user convenience. 
[16] 
 
Confidentiality.  To provide the liberty of owner customization while ensuring 
confidentiality, PLUTUS relies on an intricate lockbox scheme with multiple levels of 
keys.  At the data level, PLUTUS uses a block structure to encrypt each individual block 
with a unique symmetric key.  These block keys are then encrypted within a lockbox 
accessed via a file-lockbox key common to all files within a filegroup.  The filegroup 
owner creates the file-lockbox key when the file is created and then distributes it to all 
users.  PLUTUS uses an asymmetric file-verify key or a file-sign key protocol to 
differentiate between readers and writers respectively (see Figure 3).  These keys are used 
to sign or verify a cryptographic hash of the file block contents to provide integrity.  
Upon requesting a file, the server passes the encrypted lockbox and encrypted block 
contents to the user.  The user then “unlocks” the lockbox with the file lockbox key and 
decrypts each block with its respective file block key. 
The proliferation of keys and the use of filegroups in PLUTUS complicate the key 
revocation scheme.  When multiple files across the file system (related only by access 
rights, not like a traditional directory) are encrypted with the same key, key revocation 
could cause mass re-encryption and key management problems.  However, the designers 
have implemented a clever key rotation scheme that minimizes the effects.  PLUTUS 
uses lazy revocation such that a revoked user can still read files that were accessible at 
the time of revocation.  A problem arises due to the use of filegroups because upon re-
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encrypting a file, different files within the same group will require different keys.  Since a 
primary motivation for using filegroups in the first place was to minimize the number of 
keys, Kallahalla et al [16] designed a rotation scheme that ensures that the new 
encryption key is related to the keys for all files in the filegroup.  The system performs 
the re-encryption with the latest filegroup keys, but all valid users can generate previous 
versions from the latest key.  The result is that all valid users can “regenerate” the proper 
key for a given file if they have the latest filegroup key.  The new filegroup key is only 
disseminated to currently valid users such that revoked users. 
Inode 1, Block 4
Inode 1, Block 3
Inode 1, Block 2
Inode 1, Block 1
File Block Key 4
File Block Key 3
File Block Key 2
File Block Key 1
Filegroup Z
Filegroup Y
Filegroup X
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . . 
Inode 2Bar
Inode 1Foo
Inode PointerFilename Key*
Directory
*Filename keys and Filegroup name keys are optional to prevent an
intruder from gaining information from an unencrypted directory
**File verify/sign keys are public, but only distributed to qualified users
Inode Header
Lockbox File
Inode 2, Block 4
Inode 2, Block 3
Inode 2, Block 2
Inode 2, Block 1
File Block Key 4
File Block Key 3
File Block Key 2
File Block Key 1
Lockbox File
Public** File Sign 
Key
Public** File 
Verify Key
Symmetric File 
Lockbox Key
Client Machine
 
    Figure 3 PLUTUS Key System 
 
Integrity.  PLUTUS does not trust the file server and cannot, therefore, rely on it to 
distinguish between writers and readers.  Instead it uses two types of keys, file-sign keys 
and file-verify keys, to make the respective determination.  Upon attempting to read or 
write, the user verifies the digital signature and hashed contents of the file with these 
keys.  If the user obtains unexpected results, the user can determine that the file has been 
illegally modified.   
 
Availability.  The entire design of PLUTUS is intended to provide scalability.  Placing 
the key management responsibility on the clients instead of on a trusted server prevents a 
server bottleneck due to computationally expensive cryptographic operations.  PLUTUS 
relies heavily on filegroups to limit the number of cryptographic keys.  Filegroups consist 
of all files with identical sharing attributes and can, therefore, be protected using the same 
key.  This allows users with filegroup privileges to access a file within the group even if 
the owner is not on-line, avoiding the requirement for a user to contact the owner directly 
to get the key with every file access.  The filegroup concept does not rely on a 
hierarchical structure so that the grouping is strictly a product of the associated files’ 
permission attributes. 
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 PLUTUS does provide much greater scalability and a clever key rotation process 
to minimize key management responsibilities associated with key revocation, but the 
system still requires the file’s owner to provide a copy of the file’s symmetric key to each 
user.  Filegroups help to minimize the file owner-user communication, but they do not 
eliminate the original responsibility for the owner to distribute the keys. 
 
Performance.  The designers of PLUTUS used OpenAFS to construct their system.  The 
performance of the file system itself is comparable to the unmodified OpenAFS system, 
because the server does not have to perform any extraneous operations during file access.  
However the cost to the client system where cryptographic operations are performed 
demonstrated to be 1.4 times slower than SFS.  The authors present a credible argument 
to justify this decrease in performance, because they used worst-case scenarios to derive 
their figures.  This comparison only takes into account a single file read and write 
combination which does not take advantage of the design enhancement offered by 
PLUTUS.  PLUTUS is designed for scalability and to relieve server bottleneck which 
may arise with multiple file access requests in standard SFS.  Kallahalla et al [16] reason 
that the average latency for protracted use would favor the use of PLUTUS. 
 
3.8 SiRiUS – Securing Remote Untrusted Storage   
SiRiUS is designed to provide its own cryptographic read-write file access on top 
of any existing untrusted networked file system (NFS, CIFS, Yahoo, etc.).  Via a 
software daemon, the system intercepts all file access system calls and converts them 
accordingly.  The concept is to be able to establish a secure file sharing environment 
without significantly modifying the performance of an existing network storage medium.  
SiRiUS can provide security to an existing system without requiring any hardware 
modifications; the developers view the system as a “stop-gap” measure to provide 
additional security to existing systems.  Often times, organizations cannot afford to 
upgrade their current systems and must continue to operate with limited security until 
which time the option to upgrade security measures becomes available; SiRiUS can 
provide an interim solution [12]. 
 
Confidentiality.  All files are encrypted in a secure environment prior to being stored on 
the server, such that neither the server nor the server administrator ever has access to 
unencrypted data.  Additionally, the computationally costly encryption operations are 
performed on the relatively lightly loaded client machine, and the fact that the data is 
already encrypted obviates any requirement to establish a secure channel to send the file 
to the server.  Each file owner maintains a master encryption key (MEK) and a master 
signing key (MSK).  Each file has a unique symmetric file encryption key (FEK) 
provided to all users and a file signing key (FSK) provided only to authorized writers to 
the file.  The system provides a “freshness guarantee” by maintaining a metadata 
freshness file for each directory.   
All files are separated into two parts: an md-file metadata file and a d-file data 
file.  The metadata file contains a block for the file owner’s MEK, a block for every valid 
user’s FEK (and FSK if authorized to write to the file), and a block with a hash of the 
metadata file’s contents signed with the owner’s MSK.  If the owner or a user has a key 
maintained in the file’s metadata, that person can decrypt the file.  User key revocation is 
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quick and efficient; the file owner removes the revoked user’s key block from the 
metadata file, creates a new FEK, re-encrypts the file with the new key, and then updates 
the remaining users’ key blocks with the new FEK.  The result is immediate revocation.  
 
Integrity.  In addition to added measures, SiRiUS keeps certain file system specific 
metadata unencrypted so that the file system can perform standard integrity checking 
operations.  SiRiUS keeps all access control information encrypted with the file data.  
This facilitates using the legacy file system’s standard backup procedures – if the system 
must recover from a crash, all of the needed access information is already available with 
the file.  SiRiUS uses the “freshness guarantee” to ensure that users have the most current 
version of a file preventing a rollback attack.  At a user-designated interval, the user 
timestamps the metadata freshness file. 
 
Availability.  The design decision to make no modifications to the underlying file server 
prevents SiRiUS from defending against denial of service attacks; an attacker could 
conceivably compromise the server and delete all files.  SiRiUS has no ability to 
intervene in such a circumstance and, therefore, requires users to backup their own files 
on multiple servers to limit the effects of such an attack. 
In order to add users, the perspective reader/writer of a file must send a public key 
to the file owner who will then use the public portion of the MEK to encrypt that key and 
add it to the files metadata.  Once the new user’s key is added to the metadata, the user 
has access to the file.  The key passing mechanism is not addressed in the system.  As 
previously addressed, SiRiUS supports active key revocation such that once a user’s 
access rights have been revoked, the user no longer has any form of access to the file via 
the freshness guarantee.  SiRiUS attempts to improve on other secure networked file 
system designs by allowing fine grained file access while providing the ability for a file 
owner to grant read-only or read-write access to shared files.  Other systems either allow 
access to entire directories or cannot distinguish between readers and writers. 
 
Performance.  The first time a file is accessed, the file system must return the associated 
metadata file as well as the original (to support appropriate authorization checking).  The 
metadata file is then cached to prevent the overhead of looking up and sending the 
metadata file on subsequent retrievals for the same file.  Additionally, many SiRiUS file 
system calls require checking the freshness file resulting in increased network traffic and 
additional file I/O for each.  63% of the cost associated with using SiRiUS for a 1MB 
data read is due to the decryption cost.  Similarly, 40% of the cost for writing a 1MB file 
is due to signature generation. 
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4. CLASSIFICATION 
 
  
Storage 
System  
Encryption 
Location 
Trusted 
Server 
Key Revocation 
Policy 
Confidentiality 
Measures Integrity Policy 
Availability 
Policy 
Estimated 
Performance 
Overhead 
NASD Wire Yes 
Active by using 
timestamps, key 
issued one time 
Capability keys, 
separate 
authentication 
server 
Hash MAC 
checksums  to 
send data, not 
secure on disk 
Scalable to 
many users, 
subject to DOS 
20% increase over 
system with no 
security 
PASIS Wire No N/A p-m-n threshold scheme 
Data dispersed 
across storage 
nodes such that 
> p must be 
compromised 
Only m shares 
must be 
available to 
recreate the 
original 
Significant 
overhead for small 
files, negligible 
overhead for large 
files 
S4 Wire No  N/A N/A  
Detection 
scheme: 
Comprehensive 
versioning 
Intrusion 
detection and 
diagnosis to 
provide “recent” 
version 
Comparable to 
NFS 
CFS Disk Yes Manual active revocation  
Keys handed out 
to users by the 
file owner 
Privileged port 
combined w/ 
encryption 
Limited to 
manual 
distribution of 
keys/ DOS if 
server 
compromised 
 30% slower than 
NFS for standard 
workload 
SFS-RO Disk No Revocation list Self-certifying pathnames 
Self-certifying 
pathnames, 
timestamps 
Multiple 
distributed 
copies of RO 
files 
2 times slower than 
NFS for small files, 
comparable for files 
> 40 MB 
SNAD Disk No 
Lazy or active 
revocation 
options, no 
decision 
Lockbox 
Non-linear 
checksum of 
original text 
stored along with 
encrypted file 
Potential DOS if 
lockbox server is 
compromised 
Only the least 
secure option is 
comparable to a 
system w/o security 
PLUTUS Disk  No 
Lazy revocation, 
revoked user 
retains same file 
permissions as 
time of 
revocation 
Lockbox with 
user control over 
key 
dissemination.  
Users must 
secure 
distribution 
themselves 
Stored 
encrypted, but 
requires 
augmentation to 
ensure integrity 
Uses filegroups, 
but requires file 
owner to 
distribute keys 
1.4 times decrease 
from SFS for single 
file access 
 
SiRiUS Disk  No Active Revocation 
Combination of 
Master 
Encryption Key 
and File 
Encryption Keys 
Freshness 
guarantee  
timestamp 
Scalable to 
Internet, but 
requires file 
owner to 
distribute FEK  
20 times slower 
than NFS for small 
files, 2-6 times 
slower for 1MB files 
 
Table 1 System Description 
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics described in the previous sections. 
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Security Measure Confidentiality Integrity Availability Performance Total 
Encrypt-on-disk 2 2 0 0 4 
Encrypt-on-wire 1 1 0 0 2 
Threshold scheme 1 1 2 2 6 
Timestamps 0 2 0 2 4 
Digital signatures 0 2 0 0 2 
Checksums 0 1 0 1 2 
Lazy revocation 1 0 2 2 5 
Active revocation 2 1 1 0 4 
Key distribution server 1 0 1 1 3 
Manual key distribution 2 0 0 0 2 
Lockbox key mechanism 2 0 1 1, 2* 4,5* 
Self-Certifying pathnames 1 0 2 1 4 
Filegroups 0 0 1 1 2 
Comprehensive versioning 0 2 2 2 6 
Table 2 Quantitative Comparison of Security Measures 
 
The table uses a scale between 0-2 to assign values to the level of security of a particular 
security attribute.  0 denotes that the security measure does not affect the attribute, 1 
denotes that the measure enhances security, 2 denotes that the measure significantly 
enhances security.  For performance, the scale is modified to include three values (0-2) 
due to vastly differing performance costs.  A 0 denotes that the measure significantly 
slows down system performance, a 1 denotes a significant performance penalty, and a 2 
indicates a limited performance penalty (all systems suffer some performance 
degradation as a result of added security measures).    While these figures are based on 
empirical data derived from the authors’ research of each system, it is important to note 
that they are a subjective representation.  *PLUTUS’ key rotation scheme enhances 
performance. 
 
Security Measure NASD PASIS S4 CFS SFS-
RO 
SNAD PLUTUS SiRiUs 
Encrypt-on-disk    X X X X X 
Encrypt-on-wire X X X      
Threshold scheme  X       
Timestamps X    X   X 
Digital signatures     X  X  
Checksums X     X*   
Lazy revocation     X X X  
Active revocation X   X    X 
Key distribution server X        
Manual key distribution    X     
Lockbox key mechanism      X X  
Self-certifying pathnames     X    
Filegroups    X  X X  
Comprehensive versioning   X      
Table 3 Security Measure Applications to Surveyed Systems 
* Digital signatures are not considered for SNAD since the authors determined that they 
were too expensive 
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Table 3 maps security measures to the systems that use them.  An “X” denotes that the 
system applies the security measure in some form. 
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Figure 4 Quantitative Comparison of Secure Storage Systems 
 
 The quantitative values in Figure 4 are derived by summing the total scores of 
each security measure that applies to each system.  While the numbers provide some 
measure for comparison, one must consider the purpose of each system in conjunction 
with the evaluation.  For instance, both PASIS and S4 are survivable storage systems 
which should be used as part of a larger, secure storage system.  Most authors mention 
that using their design in conjunction with a survivable storage system would provide the 
best security.  Additionally, SFS-RO receives a high quantitative score, but it is limited to 
read-only applications. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 All of the systems share a common goal: to protect stored data from the effects of 
a malicious adversary.  From this common ground, however, the design approaches to 
reach this goal vary tremendously.  Some systems aim to prevent an adversary from ever 
having access to data, while others assume that intrusions are inevitable and try to limit 
the amount of damage an intruder can introduce.  Some systems separate data onto 
multiple storage servers to eliminate a single point of attack, and others rely on 
centralized trusted servers to effectively manage cryptographic keys.  Some systems store 
encrypted data and others require encryption prior to transmitting messages on the wire.  
All of these examples present large fundamental differences that provide options to 
potential users of a storage security medium.  It is very difficult to make direct 
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comparisons between the systems because of the varied approaches, but potential users 
can select the most applicable solution to their specific problems. 
 The most secure solution will likely be a combination of the systems described.  
In fact, the majority of the designers of the systems recommend that their solution be part 
of a larger security plan.  For example, if a user can accept additional cryptographic 
latency there is no reason to avoid encrypting data before applying a threshold scheme.  
The result would provide the security of encryption without relying on a trusted server 
and would increase the degree of availability.  The problem with such layering, however, 
is the performance penalty.  It is therefore a design requirement to analyze the tradeoffs 
between security and performance. 
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